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As the concern with drugs has risen ever higher, enormous polit-
ical attention has been focused on the need for a national strategy.
Congress created a new drug czar's office to coordinate federal an-
tidrug efforts. It also charged this new office with setting, for the
first time, a national drug control strategy. A focus on national
strategy, however, is misplaced because it ignores the local nature of
drug problems.
During the second half of the 1980s, Congress expressed growing
frustration with the internecine feuds between federal agencies and
the failure of various coordinating mechanisms to prevent strategic
and tactical conflict. In 1984, the executive branch responded by
proposing legislation creating the National Drug Enforcement Pol-
icy Board,' chaired by the Attorney General. Officials from other
federal drug enforcement agencies, such as the Customs Service and
the Drug Enforcement Administration, were seconded as staff for
this new interagency organization; it had only a small staff of its
own. In 1987, the President expanded the Board to include the
"demand side" agencies, such as the National Institute on Drug
Abuse and the Department of Education, and rechristened it the Na-
tional Drug Policy Board. 2 Again, the Board was staffed by person-
nel from the member agencies.
The failure of the Board, even in its expanded form, to set strat-
egy was clear. Its products, such as the National and International
Drug Law Enforcement Strategy, were simply compendia of descrip-
tions of existing programs which did not attempt to relate means to
ends or to set budget priorities. 3 Struggles about which agency was
t The RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C. The authors would like to acknowl-
edge the assistance of Patrick Murphy, co-author of an earlier version of this paper deliv-
ered at the 1987 conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and
Management, and of Joel Feinleib. Financial support was provided by RAND's Drug
Policy Research Center.
1. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1303, 98 Stat.
2168 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. 1988)).
2. Exec. Order No. 12,590, 3 C.F.R. 218 (1988).
3. See generally GEN. ACC'T OFF., PUB. No. GAO/GGD-88-24, NATIONAL DRUG POLICY
BOARD: LEADERSHIP EVOLVING, GREATER ROLE IN DEVELOPING BUDGETS POSSIBLE (1988).
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the "lead agency" with respect to interdiction were carried out
openly. The Board seemed little more than a medium for con-
ducting turf battles. Certainly it made no effort to provide direction
for state and local governments.
In 1988, faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation marked by
the increased availability of drugs and the greater incidence of drug-
related crime and injury, Congress forced the administration to ac-
cept the creation of a new independent office to set national drug
policy. 4 Though Congress's primary concern was the lack of coordi-
nation among federal agencies, it also required the Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy to provide annual reports setting out a
national strategy for dealing with the drug problem, 5 along with a set
of goals to be achieved within two years and ten years. 6 The first
strategy, published in September 1989, has been the centerpiece of
discussion of drug policy from the time that its first draft became
widely circulated. 7
We argue that, whatever the need for some central policy office
for the federal drug control effort, drug policy is essentially a state
and local affair. The federal government may lead, cajole, and fi-
nance, but the nation's drug policy emerges primarily out of the de-
cisions of officials at other levels. The federal government's
influence on these decisions is certainly significant, but states and
cities will continue to exercise considerable autonomy. Moreover,
such autonomy is entirely appropriate; the rationale for large-scale
federal intervention in drug policy is weak. Substantial variation in
the drug problems of different areas makes local variation in policy
appropriate. It is at the local level that there is most need for coor-
dination among the different agencies involved in drug policy. Fi-
nally, the great uncertainty about the effectiveness of various
instruments of drug policy makes local experimentation worthwhile.
4. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 1002, 102 Stat. 4181, 4181
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. 1989)).
5. Note that the title of the office has the word "national" rather than "federal." We
have a National Security Council because the federal government does indeed have
dominant responsibility for defense of the nation. On the other hand, the Federal Trade
Commission's name recognizes that anti-trust is a shared responsibility. We take the use
of "national" here to represent Congress's rather imperial view of the director's, or
"drug czar's," office.
6. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 1005, 102 Stat. at 4185 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 1504(Supp. 1989)).
7. OFF. OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CON-
TROL STRATEGY (1989) [hereinafter STRATEGY].
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L Local Variation
The most commonly used surveys of drug use only measure na-
tional levels. The National Household Survey8 and the High School
Senior Survey9 are national monitoring systems, with few local
counterparts.' 0 Discussion tends to focus on the worsening or im-
provement in various aspects of the nation's drug problem. This fo-
cus masks considerable variation at the local level.
The variation takes at least two forms. First, communities differ
considerably in the extent of illicit drug use and in the pattern of
specific drugs consumed. Though it is impossible to get precise es-
timates of illegal drug use from existing data sources, the informa-
tion available suggests that there are large and persistent local
differences in the overall prevalence of illicit drug use. Second, the
extent and nature of the problems arising out of drug use vary.
Washington, D.C., whose problems captured national headlines
during 1988 and 1989, has witnessed what reasonably might be
called an epidemic of violence surrounding the distribution of
drugs.' t The data for many other major cities, such as San Fran-
cisco and Chicago, point to no such outbreak of violence. Intrave-
nous drug use has been identified as a major factor in the spread of
the HIV infection in the New York area but a relatively minor one in
many other cities.12 Local variation in the consequences of drug use
has implications for appropriate policy measures.
A. Variation in Drug Use Patterns
Two major data collection systems measure drug use patterns in
metropolitan areas. The longer series comes from the Drug Abuse
8. The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, sponsored by the National Insti-
tute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), has been conducted every two or three years since 1972.
The results of the 1988 survey, available in the form of summary statistics, can be found
in NIDA, Highlights of the 1988 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (Aug.
1989) (press release on file with Yale Law & Policy Review).
9. NIDA sponsors an annual survey of high school seniors, conducted by the Univer-
sity of Michigan's Institute for Social Research. The results are published annually as
part of a program titled, "Monitoring the Future: A Continuing Study of the Lifestyles
and Values of Youth."
10. Some school districts carry out occasional surveys of high school drug use. See,
e.g., P. REUTER, J. HAAGA, P. MURPHY & A. PRASKAC, DRUG USE AND DRUG PROGRAMS IN
THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 76-91 (The RAND Corporation Report No. R-
3655-GWRC, July 1988) [hereinafter P. REUTER]. Questionnaires, sample designs, and
methods of analysis vary greatly, and it is usually impossible to use these surveys either
to monitor trends over time or to make comparisons among regions.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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Warning Network (DAWN).' 3 Since 1972, the federal government
has collected data on illicit drugs from hospital emergency rooms
(ERs) and medical examiners (MEs) as part of the DAWN system.14
More recently, the National Institute ofJustice established the Drug
Use Forecasting (DUF) system. 15 DUF collects and analyzes urine
specimens quarterly from a sample of arrestees in selected cities.
The sample is weighted toward persons arrested for felonies and
weighted against persons arrested for drug offenses. 16 Urinalysis of
arrestees is a leading predictor of change in a number of conse-
quences of drug use, such as community crime, drug-related emer-
gency room episodes, and child abuse. 17
Table 1 shows ME mentions of four important drugs (cocaine,
heroin, amphetamines, and PCP) per 100,000 residents in eight
metropolitan areas. The ranges for two of the drugs are quite strik-
ing. For PCP, Washington dwarfed all others, with a rate more than
double that of the next highest city, Los Angeles.' 8 For amphet-
amines, San Diego has an even more striking eminence.
There are also considerable ranges for heroin and cocaine. Chi-
cago shows much more modest levels of heroin use than do the
13. The DAWN data are published annually as NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DAWN
ANNUAL DATA (Statistical Series I).
14. A sample of ERs in 21 metropolitan areas provide data on the number of admis-
sions involving mentions of a wide variety of illicit drugs. Medical examiners in 27 areas
provide data on the number of deaths in which these drugs appear to have played a role.
In the DAWN system, the unit of measurement is a specific drug "mention," recorded
when a substance is reported by the patient or an accompanying individual, or detected
by the attending medical professional (in ERs) or by the Medical Examiner. Many cases
involve more than one drug mention; in 1988, the average number of mentions per case
by ER was 1.63 and by ME was 2.43, showing the prevalence of the simultaneous use of
different drugs. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DAWN ANNUAL DATA at 4-5 (Statistical
Series I, 1988). For comparison among cities, the ME data are more suitable than the
ER data. Interpretation of the ER data for community comparisons requires considera-
ble care. The DAWN ER sample is not a random sample representing each metropolitan
area with equal probability. Cities may differ in the types of catchment area that happen
to be represented in their DAWN sample. Thus, even ER admissions per capita do not
provide an indicator of a city or metropolitan area's drug problems that can be com-
pared to other cities. For a given city, changes in DAWN ER mentions over time within a
consistent sample of ERs may provide a reliable indicator of trends, even if absolute
levels of drug use cannot be compared reliably across cities for any one year. See id. at 6-
7 (on limitations of DAWN data).
15. DUF collects data from arrestees only in the central booking facility of each city.
It does not include arrests made by suburban police forces in any jurisdiction. NAT'L
INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., DRUG USE FORECASTING, Sept. 1989, at 2.
16. Id.
17. A recent analysis of four years of urinalysis data in D.C. suggests that trends in
arrestee drug use can predict changes in these effects by as much as one year in advance.
Id. at 8.
18. See also Thombs, A Review of PCP Trends and Perceptions, 1989, 104 PuB. HEALTH
REP. 325 (1989).
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Table 1: Drug-related Deaths per 100,000 Residents in Selected
Metropolitan Areas, by Drug, 1988, Reported by Medical
Examiners +
Metropolitan Population*
Area (millions) Cocaine Heroin Amphetamines PCP
Chicago 6.6 1.3 0.9 0.0 0.1
Detroit 4.0 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.0
Los Angeles 7.5 6.0 5.6 0.4 0.9
New York 10.5 11.2 7.0 0.0 0.3
Philadelphia 4.0 6.6 5.2 0.6 0.2
San Diego 1.9 4.1 4.8 4.8 0.2
San Francisco 3.3 4.9 5.2 1.9 0.3
Wash., D.C. 2.0 5.3 7.4 0.0 2.0
+More than one drug may be mentioned per death; therefore, the total number of
deaths may be less than the sum across any one row.
SOURCE: NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DAWN ANNUAL DATA at 5, ch. 4, and table
5.02 (Statistical Series I, 1988).
* Population covered by reporting Medical Examiners.
other cities. In a recent study of arrestees in Miami, heroin was
dropped from the data base on urinalysis because there were so few
cases involving that drug; only cocaine and marijuana were detected
in a non-trivial fraction of the population.' 9
Cocaine showed less variation across cities in the DAWN and DUF
data than did the less popular drugs. As Figure 1 shows, the
number of cocaine-related deaths per 100,000 residents grew dur-
ing the 1980s in nearly all metropolitan areas. Even so, the timing
of the spread of cocaine varied across cities. For example, in many
cities, cocaine became the dominant drug in the DAWN system by
1986, while for the District of Columbia, cocaine did not supplant
PCP in the ER data until the first half of 1988 and still has not sup-
planted heroin in the ME data.20 Cocaine use in Chicago has not
increased to nearly the same extent as other large cities. In 1988,
for the first time in recent years, the ME data showed decreases in
cocaine-related death rates in some cities (Detroit, Washington),
while other cities (notably Philadelphia) continued to show increases
(Figure 1).
19. J. Goldkamp & M. Gottfredson, Drug Abuse and Misconduct During Pre-trial
Release Among Felony Defendants (unpublished paper) (sponsored by NIJ).
20. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DAWN SEMIANNUAL REPORT, TREND DATA (Statisti-
cal Series G, No. 23, 1989).
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Table 2 shows the percentage of male arrestees testing positive
for any illegal drug (except marijuana) in thirteen cities participating




City Marijuana) Cocaine Opiates Amphetamines PCP
Chicago 69 63 22 * 13
Dallas 49 43 3 8 *
Detroit 58 54 10 0 *
Kansas City 44 41 2 2 2
Los Angeles+ 65 55 15 5 6
New Orleans 70 64 5 * 5
New York 76 67 25 0 2
Philadelphia 79 75 12 1 1
Phoenix 40 34 7 12 *
Portland 47 37 11 9 0
St. Louis 47 38 6 0 9
San Diego 76 51 27 32 4
Washington, D.C. 68 62 11 * 29
*Denotes less than 1%.
+Data for Los Angeles collected July-Sept. 1988.
SOURCE: NAT'L INST. OFJUST., U.S. DEP'T OFJUST., DRUG USE FORECASTING, June 1989,
at 4-5; NAT'L INST. OFJUST., U.S. DEP'T OFJUST., DRUG USE FORECASTING, Apr. 1989 (Los
Angeles data).
in the DUF program in 1988.22 Fewer than half of the male ar-
restees tested positive for drugs in several cities, while in others
(New York, Philadelphia, San Diego) more than three-quarters of
arrestees tested positive.
The distinctive regional patterns of use of rarer drugs found in
the DAWN data are also reflected in the DUF data: PCP is common
in Washington, D.C., and uncommon elsewhere, amphetamines are
more common in western cities, and use of opiates varies widely
across cities. There is much less variation for cocaine than for other
drugs; no city showed fewer than 34% positive (Phoenix), and the
22. Arrestees are a select group, of course, but there are no comparable indicators of
drug use in the general population. Differences in the "catchment areas" of central
intake facilities could also vitiate comparisons of DUF data across cities.
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highest figure was 75% (Philadelphia). Cocaine has become a na-
tional drug in a way that even heroin has not.2 3
Why have drugs shown such varied epidemiological patterns?
Aside from marijuana, no drug other than cocaine has been the
agent of a truly national epidemic. Even heroin has been confined
primarily to a relatively small number of cities in the Northeast,
northern Midwest, and West. 24 The rest of the nation has remained
almost uninfected. Most other drugs, such as amphetamines and
PCP, have been localized in a very small number of metropolitan
areas. Sometimes they have occasioned short epidemics in other ar-
eas, but they have essentially disappeared after a few years. 25
We offer no explanation for these varying patterns of use. What
is important for all policymakers are the significant differences in
drug consumption patterns across metropolitan areas.
B. Variation in Drug-Related Problems
The drug problem that faces each community is not simply a func-
tion of the level of drug use, no matter what the drug. It is also a
problem of public order and of the transmission of AIDS. In some
cities, drug markets have engendered enormous increases in the
level of violence; in others, it can be inferred that the recent growth
of drug markets has had little effect on the extent of violence. Simi-
larly, in some cities, drug use has been the major source of the
spread of the HIV infection, while in others drug use has been in-
volved only moderately.
1. Drug-related violence. Direct measures of drug-related vio-
lence are not available, either nationally or for individual cities. At
best, there are occasional police estimates of the share of homicides
that are related to drug use and/or distribution. Nonetheless, in-
specting trends in homicide rates (per 100,000 population) in a few
large cities over the last decade (Figure 2) canibe instructive.
23. The DAWN and DUF data show some inconsistencies for individual cities, partic-
ularly for heroin. For example, Chicago has the lowest heroin:rate in the ME sample but
the third highest rate for opiates in DUF. Similarly, San Diego has the third lowest rate
in the DAWN sample but the highest rate in the DUF data. These discrepancies may
reflect the fact that DUF samples only the inner city while DAWN covers the metropoli-
tan area.
24. See generally NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, EPIDEMIOLOGY OF HEROIN: 1964-1984
(1985) (data on national and regional patterns of heroin use).
25. For example, several cities, including San Antonio, Miami, and Kansas City, ex-
perienced brief but sharp rises in PCP-related deaths around 1978. Several years later,
the number of PCP deaths was negligible. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TRENDS IN
DRUG ABUSE RELATED HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM EPISODES AND MEDICAL EXAMINER
CASES FOR SELECTED DRUGS 1976-1985, at 128 (Statistical Series H, No. 3, 1987).
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The District of Columbia is a good example. In 1988, its homi-
cide rate rose by two-thirds from a level that was already a record
high for Washington; the 1989 rate is 20% higher than the 1988
rate. 26 The Metropolitan Police Department reports that, where a
motive for the homicide could be determined, drugs accounted for
about 80% of killings in the first half of 1988 (the last period for
which such an estimate has been published). This estimate stands in
marked contrast to an estimated 21% in 1985.27 The killing epi-
demic may be a consequence of the expansion of street drug
markets.28
In other cities, there has been no such killing epidemic. Overall,
the national homicide rate for 1988 was 15% below the 1980 level,
though 6% above the 1985 figure. Lookingjust at three of the "en-
try" cities for drugs (Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco), we
observe declines for two of the cities (Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco) and a moderate rise for New York (see Figure 2). Comparing
1988 with the starting point for the crack epidemic, 1985,29 the rec-
ord is still very mixed, and there is no consistent pattern. An un-
weighted average for the twelve largest cities was up 20%, while
four of the cities showed an actual decline.30 The divergent trends
in homicide rates among cities (Figure 2) contrast with the broadly
similar trends in ME data reflecting cocaine use in the same cities
(shown above in Figure 1).
2. Intravenous drug abuse and AIDS. The second greatest
source of the spread of the HIV infection in the United States is
26. Telephone interview with Reggie Smith, Metropolitan Police Department, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Jan. 29, 1990). There were 227 homicides in 1987, 373 in 1988, and 438
in 1989.
27. OFF. OF CRIM. JUST. PLANS & ANALYSIS, HOMICIDE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
23 (1988). Data on homicide victims show that 45% had traces of cocaine present in
their systems in 1988, compared to 17% of 1985 victims; for PCP, the 1988 figure was
22% and the 1985 figure 15%. Id. at 10. Of the roughly half of assailants for whom
drug urinalysis results were available, there was little change in the prevalence of drugs
over the same time period. Id. at 14.
28. Causes include disputes over drug transactions (e.g. disagreement about the
quantity of drugs or the price) and territories, and killings by a user seeking money for
purchase of drugs. Id. at 23-25.
29. STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 3.
30. This does not purport to be a complete analysis of homicide trends. See generally
Land, McCall & Cohen, Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There Any Invariances
across Time and Social Space? 95 AM. J. Soc. 922 (1990) (discussion of empirical research
on variation in homicide rates). Homicide is a relatively rare event and the time series
for smaller cities are unstable. Demographic trends, such as changes in the age and sex
composition of a city's population, can make a major difference in the "expected" homi-
cide rate. Yet, if crack had led to a significant increase in violence in the large cities of
the nation, we might reasonably expect to see perceptible changes in the homicide rates.
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needle sharing by intravenous drug abusers (IVDAs). 3 1 In addition,
intravenous (IV) drug use is the primary source of AIDS transmis-
sion to heterosexuals whose sexual partners are IV drug users and
to children whose mothers are infected before or during preg-
nancy. 32 As of September 1989, 21% of all reported AIDS cases
were IVDAs, a sharp increase from the 16.6% in October 1987 (in
1989, another 7% of cases were classified as IVDAs and
homosexual) .33
HIV prevalence among IVDAs across regions of the country var-
ies strikingly. For individuals reporting IV drug use, the highest
rates of HIV infection occur in and around New York City, where
between 50% and 60% of IV drug users test positive. This figure
contrasts dramatically with other cities; San Francisco, for example
had half the prevalence rates among IVDAs, and Los Angeles had
less than one-tenth. 34 By October 1987, New York State had re-
corded only 20% more AIDS cases than California, but 32.7% of
the AIDS cases in New York were attributed to IV drug use, com-
pared to only 2.5% in California. 35 By the same year, just 3% of
Texas's AIDS cases were IV drug users, compared to 47.7% of New
Jersey's. 36
The explanations for these differences cannot be readily deter-
mined. In part, they may be due to differences in local practices that
affect the likelihood of individual IVDAs using a needle already used
by large numbers of other IVDAs. New York, especially, has a long
tradition of commercial needle sharing among strangers ("shooting
galleries") which likely increases the risk of infection through this
route. Sharing among acquaintance circles may be less conducive to
the spread of the HIV infection.37
C. The Implications of Local Variation in Drug Problems
"Drug policy" is a generic term for diverse laws, emphases within
programs, and allocations of public budgets across programs. Dif-
ferences in the pattern and prevalence of drug use, the level of vio-
lence associated with drug distribution, and the extent of HIV
31. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, AIDS: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE 187
(1989).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 236; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, Oct. 1989,
at 8.
34. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 31, at 235.
35. Id. at 236.
36. Id.
37. M. KLEIMAN & R. MOCKLER, AIDS AND HEROIN: STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL 14-15,
21 (The Urban Institute, Project Report, 1988); DesJarlais & Hunt, AIDS and Intravenous
Drug Use, in NAT'L INST. OFJUST., U.S. DEPT. OFJUST., AIDS BULLETIN, Nov. 1987, at 3-4.
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infection in the drug-using population should influence the compo-
nents of these policies. For some communities, tough user sanc-
tions, strongly enforced, may be justified. Where users are buying
in street markets, generating violence and disorder, a crackdown fo-
cused on street market buyers may be effective, while in other com-
munities the same policy would be an inefficient use of criminal
justice resources. Similarly, needle distribution programs may be
appropriate in communities where there is a high level of HIV infec-
tion among intravenous drug users but little danger of increased
recruitment of drug users as a result. For other communities, with
lower rates of intravenous drug abuse and related HIV infection,
there may be little gain from needle distribution and substantial risk
of increasing the extent of intravenous drug abuse.
Two examples illustrate these points: (1) the impact of local varia-
tion on the role of street enforcement, and (2) the impact of varia-
tion in heroin abuse and HIV infection on treatment policies.
1. Street enforcement. The problems of persistent and threaten-
ing street markets put great pressure on city police departments to
focus their attention on eliminating these markets. 38 This pressure
is felt by all jurisdictions, including some that have experienced few
problems. For example, a suburban prosecutor in the Washington
metropolitan area noted that the drug squad in his county had in-
creased tenfold in the last four years and now was generating a large
number of minor possession cases that his office was unwilling to
prosecute.39 Moreover, he saw no great threat in his affluent juris-
diction from the operation of street markets. 40 For him, the pres-
sure for such street level enforcement constituted a major and
inappropriate reallocation of resources away from pursuing more
serious property crime, which the police no longer so actively pur-
sued. Yet the drumbeat of concern about drug-related violence is
such that it is a major battle for him to avoid a large scale commit-
ment to low level drug enforcement. 4 1
38. For a review of the potential and limitations of street market enforcement, see
Kleiman & Smith, State and Local Drug Enforcement: In Search of a Strategy, in DRUGS AND
CRIME (M. Tonry & J. Wilson eds.) (forthcoming). See also NAT'L INST. OF JUST., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT: EXAMINING THE ISSUES (M. Chaiken
ed. 1988).
39. Communication to the authors.
40. Indeed, these markets were less "street" than "parking lot," in which the trans-
actions were executed between buyers and sellers in cars. The disorder surrounding
these markets appeared to be quite modest.
41. Communication to the authors.
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For the District of Columbia, on the other hand, the need to sup-
press the street markets and associated violence is acute. Aggressive
enforcement activities against users who patronize these markets
could be justified. By making it risky for users to enter these mar-
kets, it might be possible to break up at least some of them. The
consequences for drug use might be quite modest and, by them-
selves, not worth the costs. The dispersion of the trade to more
discreet settings, however, could yield major gains in terms of safety
and community quality of life.
2. Treatment Programs. The size and characteristics of the
drug-using population can affect the nature of the tasks faced by the
public treatment system. For example, the number of heroin users
in a city should affect the design of the system, depending on the
particular treatment approach adopted.
Heroin dependence is, as yet, the only form of drug dependence
for which there is a proven pharmacological maintenance therapy,
namely oral administration of methadone. 42 In cities where heroin
epidemics of the 1970s left behind cohorts of long-term addicts,
now mostly in their mid-30s, public treatment systems have tradi-
tionally emphasized provision of methadone, under medical super-
vision, with varying combinations of support services and varying
degrees of commitment to progressive reduction of dosages. There
has been fierce controversy over the goals of methadone treatment
and disappointment in its general failure to "cure" addiction (in the
sense of inducing abstinence by large numbers of those treated).43
At least until the AIDS epidemic ravaged intravenous drug abusers,
many cities and states had begun to move away from methadone
maintenance as a preferred therapy for heroin addicts. 44 Those in
charge of public treatment systems in cities with severe problems of
heroin addiction can choose either to emphasize methadone mainte-
nance or to rely on therapeutic communities and outpatient pro-
grams for heroin users, with the structure, staffing, and financing of
programs varying accordingly. The choice would depend on local
experience with programs of either type, on considerations of cost,
and on beliefs concerning the basic goals for treatment. There are
many arguments for and against methadone maintenance in theory
and in practice. The relevant point is that because no city has solved
42. See generally Dole, Implications of Methadone Maintenance for Theories of Narcotic Addic-
lion, 260J.A.M.A. 3025 (1988).
43. Kirn, Methadone Maintenance Treatment Remains Controversial Even After 23 Years of
Experience, 260 J.A.M.A. 2970 (1988).
44. Cooper, Methadone Treatment and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 262 J.A.M.A.
1664 (1989).
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its heroin problem, reasonable people disagree on basic issues of
how to address it and there is a strong case for local autonomy in
setting treatment policy for heroin addicts.
Treatment programs for those dependent on non-opiate drugs
are diverse, and there is a great deal of uncertainty about the effec-
tiveness and appropriateness of different types of treatment for dif-
ferent users. The current rule of thumb cited by treatment
professionals is that "you treat the patient, not the drug." With the
exception of heroin, the choice of treatment depends on characteris-
tics of the dependent person (personality, motivation, degree of so-
cial and family support, insurance coverage) rather than the
particular drug to which she happens to be addicted. Thus, the vari-
ations among cities in the popularity of particular drugs may not
significantly affect the optimal design of the treatment system. 45 But
variation in the numbers, ages, sex, and personal and family charac-
teristics of clients entering the public treatment system would deter-
mine the relative importance of residential, daycare, and outpatient
facilities, group homes and aftercare programs, adolescent and
adult-oriented programs, and other programs.
Where HIV infection has spread to a significant percentage of the
IVDA population in a community, drug policy must reflect that fact.
For such cities, a focus on eliminating shooting galleries and getting
intravenous drug users into some form of treatment are the domi-
nant priorities. The risks and benefits associated with needle ex-
change programs change. Consideration may have to be given to
removing or relaxing prohibitions on the unlicensed possession of
hypodermic needles. 4 6
The preceding examples show just some of the ways in which the
variation among localities in the nature and severity of drug use and
drug trafficking and violence affect the costs, benefits, and feasibility
of different policies. Differing local conditions demand diverse
responses.
45. This conclusion would have to be modified if new forms of pharmacologic treat-
ment of dependence on some drugs prove successful. Different drugs present different
problems of diagnosis and requirements for detoxification; for example, a city with a
significant PCP problem needs trained staff in emergency medical services for handling
the psychotic and violent reactions occasionally exhibited by users of this drug. See Price
& Giannini, Management of PCP Intoxication. AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, Dec. 1985, at 115.
46. Police targeting of individuals carrying such equipment has the effect of increas-
ing the attractiveness of shooting galleries. See Kleiman, AIDS, Vice and Public Polic', 51
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 360, 363 (1988).
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II. Instruments of Drug Policy
State and local agencies do not serve only as conveyor belts, car-
rying national drug policy to the citizens. By their nature and his-
torically, local agencies have wide discretion; drug policy as it affects
local drug problems is the sum of decisions taken mostly at local
levels. Though the renewed salience of drug abuse as a national
political issue has increased centralization, attempts to impose a na-
tional drug strategy from above are both inappropriate and unwork-
able. The real coordination needs to be at the local level.
A. The Local Nature of Implementation
A conventional taxonomy of drug abuse policy uses Enforcement,
Treatment, and Prevention as major headings. 47 Enforcement can
be further subdivided into source-country programs, interdiction,
high-level enforcement, and street-level or retail enforcement. Each
class of policies has been the responsibility of a different set of insti-
tutions. Agencies of the federal government are solely responsible
for implementation of source-country programs and interdiction.
High-level enforcement is a mixed federal/local responsibility; espe-
cially in recent years, task forces from different agencies at different
levels of government have cooperated in investigations targeted at
large importing or wholesaling organizations. In contrast, most ar-
rests and sentences are carried out by local agencies, and local and
state courts and prisons mete out most of the punishment for drug
offenses. In 1986, the most recent year for which post-arrest data
are available, approximately seven times as many persons were sen-
tenced to incarceration in state prisons and local jails for felony
drug offenses as were sentenced to federal prisons. 48
47. See, e.g., J. POLICH, P. ELLICKSON, P. REUTER & J. KAHAN, STRATEGIES FOR CON-
TROLLING ADOLESCENT DRUG USE (The RAND Corporation Report No. R-3076-CHF,
Feb. 1984) [hereinafterJ. POLICH].
48. There were 8,152 federal prison sentences for drug law violations from July 1,
1985 to June 30, 1986. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, FEDERAL OF-
FENSES AND OFFENDERS: SENTENCING AND TIME SERVED, June 1987, at 2. In 1986, in
contrast, there were approximately 60,000 sentences to prisons and jails resulting from
felony indictments in state courts. There were 48,651 sentences of incarceration for
drug trafficking, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 1986, Feb. 1989, at 3, and an estimated 11,743 for drug convictions. This esti-
mate is reached as follows: the data show 202,463 convictions for "other felonies," id. at
2, an estimated 10% of which were for drug possession. Id. at 3. Of the "other felo-
nies" convictions, 58% resulted in incarceration. Id. at 2. Assuming that those con-
victed for drug possession were sentenced to incarceration at the same rate as all felons
in the "others" statistical category, the extrapolation yields the 11,743 figure. The esti-
mate is rough, but supports the point that there is an enormous disparity between the
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Implementation of treatment and prevention programs is almost
entirely the responsibility of local agencies or school districts. The
federal government's main role is to fund some of these activities,
attaching various conditions to its grants. The federal government
also influences the direction of policy through its dominant role in
sponsoring research and technical assistance and through a more
diffuse form of moral suasion, exercised now by the Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy in the executive branch.
1. Enforcement. The frontline enforcement agency is the city
or county police department. The intensification of drug law en-
forcement in recent years has been the work of local police agencies,
prosecutors, courts, and corrections agencies. While 85% of those
in prison for a drug-related offense in 1988 were held in state pris-
ons, only 15% were in the federal system.49 More specifically, en-
forcement has been the work of large-city police departments.
Figure 3 shows the arrest rates (per 100,000 population) for drug
abuse offenses from 1980 to 1987. Central cities with populations
greater than 250,000 account for most of the increase in the na-
tional rate; the rate for central cities rose from 402 per 100,000 in
1980 to 944 per 100,000 in 1988. These central cities contained
19% of the population nationwide that was covered by the Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In
suburban areas, containing 40% of the population covered by the
UCR, arrest rates for drug offenses rose much more slowly, from
213 to 305 per 100,000 residents, during the same period.50
Local agencies have wide latitude, not only in tactics of drug law
enforcement, but also in strategies. Police determine the timing and
locations of the "sweeps" that have become common. 5' Between
them, police and prosecutors determine enforcement priorities.
Even without legislation or formal announcements, many jurisdic-
tions effectively decriminalized marijuana possession during the
1970s by not making it a priority for the law enforcement system. 52
In big cities hard pressed by cocaine sales and attendant violence,
the enforcement of the marijuana prohibition does not occupy much
state and federal systems in the absolute number of drug-related incarcerations. Addi-
tional commitments to local jails resulted from misdemeanor convictions in state courts.
49. Address by William Bennett, American Legislative Exchange Council (July 19,
1989).
50. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 1988, at 171 (1989) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1988].
51. See Kleiman & Smith, supra note 38.
52. SeeJ. POLIC, supra note 47, at 15.
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time of the police or courts. 53 The number of marijuana possession
arrests fell from 338,000 in 1980 to 327,000 in 1988; as a percent-
age of all arrests for drug law violations, this represented a decline
from 58% to 28%. 5 4
2. Treatment. Most publicly financed treatment for drug
abuse is provided directly by county or city health departments or
specialized treatment agencies. Programs-detoxification, outpa-
tient, or residential-are operated by public agencies or contractors.
In the latter case, the public agency often purchases some, but not
all, of the "slots" in a treatment facility. Federal funding for drug
treatment comes through the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health (ADM) block grants. State and local governments add funds
from general revenues and in most places user fees reimburse a por-
tion of costs. State funds in the aggregate are more than twice the
amount of the federal funds. 55 Medicaid, a state program to which
the federal government contributes matching funds in different pro-
portions, covers drug abuse treatment in some states, mostly under
an optional "clinic services" provision. There are no estimates of
how much treatment is currently financed by Medicaid.
3. Prevention. At all levels of government, prevention has al-
ways received a far lower proportion of public funds for drug pro-
grams than enforcement or treatment. Drug abuse prevention
traditionally has been a major concern primarily for the state and
local substance abuse agencies handling ADM block grant funds, at
least twenty percent of which had to be devoted to prevention activi-
ties. Few states spent more than what was required. 56 More re-
cently, the Drug Free Schools and Communities Act created a new
system of grants. These grants could be disbursed either through
53. This statement refers to low-level enforcement. Much of the federal enforce-
ment effort is directed against marijuana importers, and both federal and some local
resources are directed against domestic growers and large-scale traffickers. See generally
M. KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA: COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROL (1989) (analysis of federal
enforcement policies directed against marijuana).
54. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1988, supra note 50, at 167.
55. W. BUTYNSKt, D. CANOVA & S. JENSEN, STATE RESOURCES AND SERVICES RELATED
TO ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE PROBLEMS, FISCAL, YEAR 1988 at i (Report for Nat'l Inst.
on Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism and NIDA, 1989) (on file with authors) [hereinafter W.
BUTYNSKI].
56. In fiscal year 1987, state drug agencies reported spending 15% of the total of
state and federal treatment and prevention funds on prevention programs. Id. At the
federal level, 15% of all drug-related outlays-international programs, enforcement,
treatment, and prevention-in fiscal year 1989 were for prevention. GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
PUB. No. GAO/GGD-89-96FS, FEDERAL DRUG-RELATED EFFORTS: BUDGET INFORMATION
BY STRATEGY at app. III (June 1989).
Yale Law & Policy Review
the state education agency or through another agency designated by
the governor of each state. 57
School prevention programs vary considerably in content and ap-
proach, in the grade levels targeted, and in whether regular class-
room teachers, health or physical education specialists, or even non-
teachers such as police officers teach the courses. 58 Cities and sub-
urban areas differ greatly in school dropout rates, race and ethnicity,
and in the number of young adolescents already involved with
drugs. These differences should affect priorities among school and
non-school-based prevention programs, between prevention and
early intervention, the types of programs adopted, the degree to
which they depend on family involvement, and the age groups
targeted. Local autonomy and variety have been great, and they are
likely to remain so.
B. Drug Policy Needs To Be Coordinated At the Local Level
It is at the state and, especially, the local levels that real coordina-
tion is required. At the local level, the action of one agency can
have a significant impact on another; ideally, their efforts ought to
be coordinated to use their resources most effectively. At a mini-
mum, the agencies ought to be aware of one another's intended ac-
tions. Coordination across jurisdictions, among different types of
institutions, and between the public and private sectors also pays off
when there are significant economies of scale achievable by a com-
mon program.
The Strategy proposes several interdepartmental committees to
coordinate various aspects of drug control policies, presumably in
the belief that coordination by the ONDCP will be more efficient
than the system of "lead agencies" that it replaces. 59 The federal
government, however, is directly responsible for only the instru-
ments of drug control policy that are least promising for the long
term, such as interdiction and source-country drug eradication pro-
grams. 60 For the instruments that are receiving new emphasis-
57. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4121, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-127 (repealed 1988).
58. See P. REUTER, supra note 10, at app. B (description of courses in Washington
metropolitan area school districts); Botvin, Substance Abuse Prevention Research: Recent De-
velopments and Future Directions, 56 J. SCHOOL HEALTH 369 (1986) (more general
discussion).
59. STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 16, 46, 84.
60. See Reuter, Can the Borders Be Sealed?, 92 PUB. INTEREST 51 (1988) (on limitations
of interdiction programs); Reuter, Eternal Hope: America's Quest for Narcotics Control, 79
PUB. INTEREST 79 (1985) (on limitations of source-country programs); Lee, lWhy the U.S.
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street-level enforcement, user sanctions, treatment, and preven-
tion-the federal role is to sponsor research and demonstrations
and to provide a fraction of the money.
Little coordination needs to be done at the federal level, since one
cabinet department (usually one agency within a department) exer-
cises most of the national government's functions in treatment (Al-
cohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration), local law
enforcement (Bureau of Justice Assistance), and prevention (De-
partment of Education). The only potential challenger for the lead
agency role in any of these fields is the new Office of Substance
Abuse Prevention (OSAP), which since 1986 has taken over preven-
tion responsibilities formerly assigned to NIDA and the National In-
stitute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA). 61  The
Department of Labor has significant new appropriations for work-
place demonstration programs and grants for prevention and treat-
ment, and the Department of Defense is prominent both as a
provider and as a purchaser of substance abuse treatment, but
neither has yet shown a strong interest at high levels in making drug
policy. Coordination of demand reduction policies at the federal
level requires little more than the sharing of information about what
agencies plan to do in their distinct spheres of action. The role of
the ONDCP, most likely in competition with the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, would be to recommend priorities among these
separate spheres of action for federal expenditures. Once the pot of
money has been divided up, there is little reason for the federal
agencies to implement their programs in unison.
1. Treatment and punishment. As Figure 3 shows, enforcement
of the drug laws has generated an increasing number of arrests.
This increase has led to prison overcrowding. 62 Drug law enforce-
ment has also led to a wave of referrals to publicly funded treatment
programs, exacerbating the problem of treatment overcrowding.
There are no national statistics on sources of referrals to treatment
programs, but in the fifteen states that reported data on 1985 admis-
sions to NIDA, 27% of all admissions were coded "non-voluntary"
Cannot Stop South American Cocaine, 32 ORBIs 499 (1988) (on limitations of interdiction
and source-country programs).
61. OSAP is still housed within ADAMHA, as are NIDA and NIAAA, so presumably
some turf battles and coordination needs could be handled by ADAMHA without re-
course to any outside authority. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, at § 4005, 100 Stat. at
3207-111-14 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-6 (Supp. 1989)).
62. See generally GEN. ACC'T OFF., PuB. No. B-234049, PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FAC-
ING THE NATION'S PRISON SYSTEMS (1989).
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(and these are mainly referrals from the criminal justice system),
ranging from 18% in California to 59% in Texas. 63 In the District
of Columbia, referrals from the criminal justice system accounted
for just over a third of admissions to public treatment programs in
the early 1980s. 64 Between 1985 and 1986, the number of admis-
sions had tripled, and the proportion of criminal justice referrals
had-risen to over 60%.65 The biggest period of growth came during
and after "Operation Clean Sweep," which began in late 1987,66
when the District greatly increased law enforcement aimed at street
markets.67 Presumably, in part because of system constraints, pros-
ecutors and judges were willing to accept the argument that many of
those picked up in the sweep would be more suitably referred to
treatment programs than incarcerated.
No doubt the cocaine epidemic would have put a great strain on
big city treatment agencies anyway, but the process might have been
less traumatic if corrections and treatment agencies had been able
to plan jointly for such an onslaught. In many places, there are
some mechanisms for coordination among different parts of the
criminal justice system, but coordination among criminal justice and
health agencies is much less common and well established.
Ensuring adherence to a treatment regimen after an initial refer-
ral requires coordination across institutional boundaries. The expe-
rience in New York state is illustrative. From 1967 to 1979, New
York had a civil commitment program for arrestees who were or
claimed to be drug addicts, with assignments either to special state-
operated facilities or, in later years, to private residential facilities. 68
The New York civil commitment program had been intended as the
state's major effort in drug abuse treatment, but a number of defi-
ciencies led to its abandonment. 69 One of the most important
problems with the programs, according to a recent post-mortem,
was a lack of coordination among courts, treatment agencies, and
the police. 70 Many of the arrestees referred by the courts to drug
abuse treatment, either as a result of the civil proceeding or as a
63. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND PATrERNS OF
DRUG USE OF CLIENTS ADMITTED TO DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAMS IN SELECTED
STATES: ANNUAL DATA (1985).
64. P. REUTER, supra note 10, at 65.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 32, 37.
67. Id. at 65.
68. See Winick, Some Policy Implications of the New York State Civil Commitment Program. 18
J. DRUG ISSUES 561 (1988).
69. Id. at 563.
70. Id. at 564.
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condition of probation in a criminal proceeding, simply ab-
sconded.7' Warrants were issued for the arrest of absconders, but
executing these warrants was never a priority of the police. 72 Large
numbers of those referred to the program were neither punished for
their crimes nor treated for their addictions. 73 In the decade since
the end of this particular program, the criminal justice system has
initiated treatment in a far greater number of cases. If the public
treatment system is to reduce demand for illegal drugs and help
prevent recidivism, cooperation among treatment and corrections
agencies will have to be much more effective than it was during pre-
vious drug abuse epidemics.
2. Prevention. Anti-smoking campaigns have provided a
model for the current generation of programs, both school-based
and community-based, designed to prevent abuse of other sub-
stances. Most campaigns that are not exclusively school-based use
the mass media either as the primary means for delivering a
message or as a means of reinforcing messages delivered face-to-
face. Reviewing the experience of anti-smoking campaigns shows
that the most successful ones used simultaneous and fairly concen-
trated delivery of messages through a variety of media. 74 More re-
cently, a community-wide program to prevent use of alcohol and
other drugs by young adolescents in the Kansas City area, aimed at
both inner city and suburbs, has shown some success in evalua-
tions. 75 The Kansas City effort incorporated many features of suc-
cessful anti-smoking campaigns, most notably coordination across
multiple media and institutions.
The evidence, meager as it is, indicates that boundaries among
local jurisdictions and traditional roles of public and private agen-
cies do not correspond well to the requirements of successful pre-
vention campaigns. The relevant geographic area for a campaign
like that in Kansas City is probably the media "market area," which
often cuts across several counties and independent cities, and in the
case of Kansas City, two states. The agencies involved in such ef-
forts can include schools, health care providers (public and private),
71. Id. at 568.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 566-67.
74. Flay, Mass Media and Smoking Cessation: A Critical Review, 77 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH
153, 157 (1987).
75. Pentz, Dwyer, Mackinnon, Flay, Hansen, Wang & Johnson, A Multi-Community
Trial for Primary Prevention of Adolescent Drug Abuse: Effects on Drug Use Prevalence, 261
J.A.M.A. 3259, 3264 (1989).
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social services, recreation departments, churches, local universities,
and voluntary and community organizations.
Unlike law enforcement and treatment, most of the agencies in-
volved in prevention of substance abuse have primary missions only
peripherally related to substance abuse; prevention is an added task
for which they generally do not have full-time trained workers. Typ-
ically, the only institutions for which prevention is a primary con-
cern are the small prevention units within the local agencies that
handle federal and state ADM funds.
Even if there were funds for large prevention agencies, focusing
efforts there might not be the most effective way to change behavior.
Substance abuse prevention is intimately involved with forming val-
ues and personal habits. People are less likely to look to organs of
government for guidance in these matters than to the institutions
that Peter Berger and his colleagues have named, in a related con-
text, "mediating structures." These structures include the neighbor-
hood, family, church, and voluntary associations. 7 6 Outside of
schools, government should foster the work of these institutions
rather than attempt to deliver services directly. Since useful knowl-
edge is likely to be very specific to particular contexts, such a role is
more suited to local officials who know the neighborhoods,
churches, and associations involved than to national officials.
Thus in prevention, as in our previous example of law enforce-
ment and treatment, the gains from coordinating policies across
agencies and jurisdictions are greater at the local or regional level
than at the federal level. The federal role should consist largely of
research and dissemination of findings.
IlL Trends in Intergovernmental Relations in Drug Abuse Policy
Federal funding for drug abuse treatment and prevention pro-
grams and for law enforcement assistance programs has been er-
ratic, growing rapidly during the 1970s, declining for most of the
1980s, and growing rapidly again in the last few years. With the
renewed salience of drug problems in the national political agenda,
Congress and the executive agencies have made more attempts to
set priorities and prescribe drug policy to state and local govern-
ments. These attempts, embodied in the 1986 and 1988 Anti-Drug
Abuse Acts discussed in this section, and in the recommendations of
the National Drug Control Strategy discussed in section IV below,
76. See generally P. BERGER & R. NEUIHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDI-
ATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1977).
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ignore the local variation in drug problems and the inherently local
nature of the instruments of policy.
A. Treatment and Prevention Programs
Centralization of government programs in drug abuse treatment
and prevention has increased over the years, beginning in earnest in
the 1960s. The early 1980s were an exception to the general trend,
as funding was slashed. More recent legislatioi has returned to the
earlier trend.
1. Before 1980. Specialized treatment of drug abuse in the
United States began in the 1930s with some pioneering programs
for opiate addicts in federal prisons. 77 Few programs for the nonin-
carcerated existed before the 1960s. In large part because federal
policy initiatives in the 1960s and early 1970s made funding avail-
able, substance abuse treatment became a distinictt and routine func-
tion of state and local health departments.
In the 1960s, federal funds weaned states ai4Ay from reliance on
large psychiatric hospitals for dealing with merial health problems
of all sorts and fostered the development of Community Mental
Health Centers (CMHCs). The Alcoholic and Narcotic Rehabilita-
tion Amendments of 1968 authorized grants to support building
and staffing CMHCs in order to "provide incentives for localities to
initiate and develop new services for alcoholics and alcohol and
drug abusers." 78 Subsequent legislation in 1970 and 1972 set up a
system of project and formula grants to states and localities for sub-
stance abuse treatment, to be administered by two new institutes
within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse, and the NationAl Institute on Alco-
hol Abuse and Alcoholism. 79  NIDA and NIAAA also had
responsibility for research and demonstration programs. During
77. In the early years of this century, there had been mary private clinics treating
opiate and cocaine addiction, but these were closed as federal harcotics prohibition took
effect after World War I. See DeLong, Treatment and Rehabilitatioh, in DEALING WITH DRUG
ABUSE 173-255 (1972) (history of early efforts at drug abuse treatment).
78. Public Health Service Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-574, § 301, 82 Stat.
1005, 1006-09 (repealed 1981).
79. The most important authorizations were contained in the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1, 84 Stat. 1236,
1238-40, and the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86
Stat. 65, 76-83. In 1974 NIDA and NIAAA were placed under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse,
and Mental Health Agency (ADAMHA), along with the National Institute of Mental
Health, and this arrangement has remained. Cloud, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A
Study of the Possible Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725,
782-83 (1989). Cloud's article contains a good discussion of the legislative history of
prevention and treatment programs.
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the 1970s, these categorical programs steadily expanded, and the
organizational structure of local and state agencies handling the
programs tended to reflect the major types of programs: alcohol
and other drugs were administratively distinct, each often housed
with a mental health or mental hygiene agency, separate from other
health and social service agencies.
2. The early Reagan years. The apogee of local autonomy for
treatment programs was reached during years of fiscal famine in the
1980s. As in other aspects of social and health policy, the Reagan
administration cut overall budgets and reduced the number of fed-
eral controls on states by introducing block grants. Title IX of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 consolidated all related
programs into the Alcohol, Drug, and Mental Health (ADM) block
grant.80 The requirements were few: states had to spend half the
funds on mental health programs and half on substance abuse, and
of the substance abuse funds at least 35% had to be spent on alco-
hol programs and at least 35% on other drug programs.8 1 Dollars
were also few: substance abuse treatment and prevention appropria-
tions fell by exactly one-third from the high point in 1979 ($336
million) to $224 million in 1982, the first full year of the ADM block
grant.8 2
When treatment and prevention programs were consolidated into
the ADM block grants, and law enforcement assistance grants were
almost eliminated, reporting requirements were greatly reduced. In
most states, management information systems and evaluation units
were allowed to fall into decrepitude.
3. The recent trend. The more recent trend, embodied in sev-
eral provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, is an increase in federal funding coupled
with a return to categorical grants and activism in the setting of pri-
orities by the federal government. Supplemental appropriations for
1989 under the 1988 Act, for example, stipulated that at least 50%
of the additional substance abuse treatment funds were to be spent
on programs for intravenous drug abusers, unless states were
granted waivers.8 3 At least 10% of funds had to be set aside for
80. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 901, 95 Stat.
357, 535-59.
81. Id., 95 Stat. at 548.
82. See Cloud, supra note 79, at 783.
83. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 2030, 102 Stat. 4181, 4200
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-4(c)(7)(B) (Supp. 1989)).
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programs for women, especially pregnant women and their depen-
dent children . 4 As a condition of receiviIg ADM block grant funds,
the same chapter required states to set up revolving funds for the
establishment of group homes for recovering alcohol and drug
addicts.8 5
Intravenous drug abuse has become a renewed concern of public
health officials because it is the most rapidly growing mode of trans-
mission of the AIDS virus. The lack of services for women, and half-
way houses for both men and women, often have been identified as
crucial gaps in the array of treatment options available in different
parts of the country.8 6 But these needs vary considerably across
states and between urban and suburban areas. Many of the states
reporting to the annual surveys of the National Association of State
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors have identified these services as
priorities for new funding within their states, but many have desig-
nated other needs, such as treatment programs for drug-involved
youth in general, the majority of whom are boys, as more pressing. 7
In the prevention field, the 1986 and 1988 Acts authorized new
grant programs rather than simply expanding the prevention com-
ponent of the ADM block grants to the states. The "Drug-free
Schools and Communities Act," part of the 1986 Act,88 directed
states to spend at least half the new prevention funds on "innovative
community-based programs of coordinated services for high-risk
youth," defined by various criteria, including pregnancy, poverty,
children of substance abusers, school dropouts, etc.89 The 1988 Act
added new categorical programs for runaway youth,90 youth
gangs, 9' and "community youth activities." 92
For both treatment and prevention programs, increased federal
funding in recent years has been accompanied by an increased fed-
eral (mainly Congressional) role in specifying how states and locali-
ties are to spend the money.
84. Id. at § 2032, 102 Stat. at 4200 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x4(c)(14) (Supp.
1989)).
85. Id. at § 2036, 102 Stat. at 4202 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x (Supp. 1989)).
86. See W. BUTYNSKI, supra note 55, and earlier reports in the same series from
NASADAD for summaries of state agency replies.
87. Id.
88. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 4101-4144, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-25-36 (repealed 1988).
89. Id. at § 4122(b), 100 Stat. at 3207-127-28 (repealed 1988).
90. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 3501, 102 Stat. at 4254 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 11801 (Supp. 1989)).
91. Id. at § 3511, 102 Stat. at 4255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11821 (Supp. 1989)).
92. Id. at § 3521, 102 Stat. at 4258-59 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11841 (Supp. 1989)).
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B. Law Enforcement
In the law enforcement area as well, the trend has been toward
centralized control and increasing involvement of the federal gov-
ernment. Unlike funding provisions for treatment and prevention,
those pertaining to federal involvement in law enforcement did not
specify the end uses of funds but attempted to encourage the states
to pass funds along to local levels.
The 1986 Act authorized a Drug Law Enforcement Grant pro-
gram, 93 later reauthorized as the "Drug Control and System Im-
provement Grant Program" in the 1988 Act,94 under which the
Bureau of Justice Assistance in the U.S. Department of Justice
makes formula grants to the states of 80% of appropriated funds
and discretionary grants of the remaining 20%. 95 The states then
award sub-grants to county and city governments, which make ex-
penditures and then bill the BJA, through their state agencies. In
fiscal year 1987, grant awards totalled $178 million; in fiscal year
1988, $56 million; and in fiscal year 1989, $119 million.96 The 1988
Act merged the grant program set up by the 1986 Act with the jus-
tice Assistance Act grant program to authorize a new state and local
law enforcement assistance program. Besides the grant programs,
BJA also has programs to provide technical assistance and training
to local and state agencies and courts. 97
City governments have complained that the state governments
pass through too small a share of these enforcement grants to them,
compared to the shares going to rural and suburban counties. The
1988 Act directed states to "give priority to those jurisdiction with
the greatest need" in distributing the grant funds, determining need
by using "the most accurate and complete data available." 98
93. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, at § 1552, 100 Stat. at 3207-41-46 (codified in
part as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3796h (Supp. 1988) and repealed in part by Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 6101(a), 102 Stat. 4240 (Supp. 1988)).
94. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 6091, 102 Stat. at 4329-39 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3751-3766 (Supp. 1989)).
95. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, at § 1552, 100 Stat. at 3207-45 (repealed 1988);
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 6091, 102 Stat. at 4336 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3761
(Supp. 1989)).
96. The Drug Enforcement Crisis at the Local Level, Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on
Aarcotics Abuse and Control, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 242 (1989) (reprinting BJA records)
[hereinafter House Hearing].
97. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 6091, 102 Stat. at 4328 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3342 (Supp. 1989)).
98. Id., 102 Stat. at 4334 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3756(b)(2), 3756(b)(4) (Supp.
1989)).
Vol. 8:36, 1990
The Limits of the Czar's Ukase
The U.S. Conference of Mayors published a survey of thirty cities
in May 1989. 99 Many reported that they had not yet received any
grant funds even though the states had all received their awards for
three years. The majority of city governments surveyed reported
that they did not know how much they would receive under the fiscal
year 1989 grant program, though by that time the states had all
known their allocations for at least a month, and the fiscal year was
more than half over.' 0 0 Naturally, there are many reasons for such
delays, which often include the inability of local governments to
comply with program requirements and to make adequate requests
on time. But it is easy to understand the attempts, so far unsuccess-
ful, of big-city mayors to modify the block grant programs and influ-
ence the design of new categorical programs aimed at drug abuse so
that state governments could be bypassed and federal money
awarded directly to city governments. 10 1 The 1988 Act imposed
new timetables on the states, requiring speedier pass-through of
both ADM and law enforcement grant funds. 10 2
The state agencies in turn complain about the time constraints
placed on their grant making process by Congress. Congress typi-
cally has not dealt with the appropriations bills when the fiscal year
starts; until recently, Congress has always appropriated more for
drug programs than was requested in the President's budget the
previous February, but the amounts have been uncertain until very
late in the process. The states are then constrained to make their
awards within the time limits, following the various procedural
rules. The states want "flexibility," while the cities want more
money, quickly.
C. The 1986 and 1988 Acts Ignore Local Variation
The 1986 and 1988 Acts revived the earlier trends of the 1960s
and 1970s, bringing stricter federal control over implementation of
drug policy. Besides controls of varying degrees of specificity on
the uses of grant funds, the 1986 and 1988 Acts imposed planning
requirements on the states. The language in the 1986 Act was
vague. As a condition of receiving the law enforcement grants,
99. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTI-DRUG
ABUSE BLOCK GRANT PROGRAMS IN CITIES (1989) (reprinted in House Hearing, supra note
96, at 88-103).
100. Id. at 9-11 (reprinted in House Hearing, supra note 96, at 98-100).
101. See, e.g., House Hearing, supra note 96, at 5 (testimony of Kathryn Whitmire,
Mayor of Houston).
102. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 6091, 102 Stat. at 4335 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 3758 (Supp. 1989)).
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states were to prepare a "statewide strategy for the enforcement of
State and local laws relating to ... controlled substances."'' 0 3 The
comparable requirement in the 1988 Act was considerably more
specific. It listed seven items that the state plans were to contain,
including the establishment of "a statewide strategy for drug and
violent crime control programs" and an "analysis of the relationship
of the proposed State efforts to the national drug control strat-
egy."' 104 This strategy was to be prepared after consultation with
local officials. 10 5 Yet in the survey of city officials by the U.S. Con-
ference of Mayors, most reported that they had not in fact partici-
pated in the development of the state plans, and a majority reported
that they had not even reviewed the state plans. 10 6
In a similar vein, the Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act in
1986 imposed fairly loose planning and coordination requirements;
state education agencies were to describe the manner in which they
would coordinate their drug prevention efforts with those of the
state agency handling the ADM block grant funds, 0 7 and local edu-
cation agencies had to "set forth a comprehensive plan" for how
they would spend money received under these programs. 10 8 The
1988 Act set out in much more detail what biennial state reports
were to contain, including descriptions of drug and alcohol
problems in the schools, descriptions of existing programs and
demographic characteristics of the populations served, and informa-
tion on how the State targeted populations. 0 9 In both cases (and in
the treatment plans that the Strategy has proposed as a requirement
for the states), requirements for increasingly detailed planning rep-
resent a step back from the more relaxed supervision of the block
grant years. Much of the new federal funding for drug abuse has
come in the form of categorical grants and set-asides, under which
the priorities set by states and local governments are circumscribed;
even with less restricted block grant funds, states must justify receiv-
ing money with plans and strategies.
103. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, at § 1552, 100 Stat. at 3207-42 (repealed
1988).
104. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 6901, 102 Stat. at 4331-33 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 3753 (Supp. 1989)).
105. Id.
106. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 99, at 9-10 (reprinted in House Hearing, supra
note 96, at 98-99).
107. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, at § 4123(b)(6), 100 Stat. at 3207-128 (re-
pealed 1988).
108. Id. at § 4126(a)(2)(A), 100 Stat. at 3207-130 (repealed 1988).
109. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 3307, 102 Stat. at 4249-50 (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 3197(a) (Supp. 1989)).
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National drug control programs have thus followed a boom-and-
bust cycle, with wide swings in funding and program priorities.
Many of our current institutions and programs began during the
Nixon administration, when heroin, which was concentrated in the
big cities of the Northeast and Midwest, caused the greatest con-
cern. The criminal propensities of heroin addicts needing to sup-
port their habits figured prominently both in the research agenda
and in the policy dialogue."t 0 In the early 1980s, drug abuse was
less salient as a topic for both the Administration and Congress.
Federal funds for treatment and local drug law enforcement dwin-
dled, though the cities were still saddled with large numbers of ag-
ing heroin addicts, dependent on public methadone programs since
the 1970s.
When drug policy returned to the national political agenda in the
mid-1980s, political discussion employed military metaphors, and
policy goals short of complete victory were not seriously debated. A
characteristically utopian title was given to "The White House Con-
ference for a Drug-Free America";"' nowhere did the conference
report acknowledge that there has never been a drug-free America.
This all-or-nothing thinking is alien to the usual practice of the
local police and health departments that actually implement drug
policy. One never hears of conferences entitled "A Homicide-Free
America" or "A Larceny-Free America" or "A Heart-Disease-Free
America." In the history of public health, only one disease, small-
pox, has been eradicated worldwide. While several infectious dis-
eases have been nearly eradicated in the United States, no chronic
disease, of which addiction is one, has ever been eliminated. An-
nouncing complete eradication of selected drugs as the goal of pub-
lic policy will hasten disillusion and encourage abandonment of
expensive measures to keep drug problems under control.
The "Czar's office" created by the 1988 Act' 12 was given a title
more in keeping with the everlasting nature of police and public
health work. It is an office of "Drug Control Policy." The Strategy
formulated by this office added some realism to the discourse at the
110. The Nixon administration did not rely solely on international and domestic law
enforcement to fight heroin. Nixon "appointed a group of liberal, nominally Demo-
cratic drug-abuse specialists . . . to lead a relatively humane treatment effort." A.
TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION 233 (1982).
111. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA, FINAL REPORT (1988).
112. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at § 1002(a), 102 Stat. at 4181 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. 1989)).
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national level, and proposed realistic, even modest, goals for reduc-
tion in the use of specific drugs; but, it did not counter the centraliz-
ing tendencies of recent legislation.
IV State and Local Drug Policy in the National Drug Control Strategy
The provisions of the 1988 Act establishing the Office of National
Drug Control Policy required that its Director produce a National
Drug Control Strategy within six months of his confirmation by the
Senate and every February 1 thereafter. Among other requirements,
the Strategy is to "review State and local drug control activities to
ensure that the United States pursues well-coordinated and effective
drug control at all levels of government." '"13 The Strategy released
in September 1989 is far superior to its predecessors produced by
the special commissions and the interagency boards that the
ONDCP replaced.114 It summarizes information about the nature
and extent of drug problems, proposes priorities, suggests changes,
and to some extent discusses implementation of those changes. In
short, it deserves the term "Strategy." While the first Strategy does
not review current state and local activities in any detail, it argues
for sets of recommendations, some addressed to State and local
government, and includes an appendix with proposed legislation.
The Strategy, at least in its first edition, has continued the path Con-
gress marked with the 1986 and 1988 Acts toward making drug con-
trol policy "national." But "national" policy that ignores local
variation is an ineffective solution to drug problems.
Rather than return to the "laissez-faire" era of the block grants,
the Strategy seems to envisage continuation of the trend toward fed-
eral government prescription of priorities in local drug law enforce-
ment and substance abuse treatment. For example, it calls for more
specificity in the State treatment plans. As a condition of receiving
block grant funds for treatment, each state will be required, accord-
ing to the Strategy, to submit a plan "which describes how funds will
be allocated among treatment facilities, and how local needs have
been inventoried and account for in those allocations." ' 5 The
States are to "describe actions they will take to make individual
113. Id. at § 1005(a)(2)(D), 102 Stat. at 4185 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp.
1989)).
114. See, e.g., DRUG ABUSE POL'Y OFF., 1984 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PREVENTION OF
DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING.
115. STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 39.
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treatment facilities more accountable for their effectiveness; to bet-
ter match drug users with appropriate treatment methods or facili-
ties; to overcome obstacles to site expansion; and to improve
coordination with social, health, and employment service agen-
cies.'116 Similarly, the individual state National Guards are re-
quired to obtain Department of Defense approval of their drug
enforcement plans before receiving federal funds to support those
activities.
The enforceability of such conditions is questionable. Federal
agencies will find it difficult to formulate objective criteria for deter-
mining whether a state plan has dealt seriously with the specified
issues or whether local officials have been consulted properly. Lack-
ing objective criteria, federal agencies would find it difficult to jus-
tify holding up a state's grants until it had produced a satisfactory
plan. Planning requirements may be a device for getting the meas-
ures preferred by the ONDCP onto state agendas, rather than a
credible threat to cut off grant funds.
A. Expansion of Prison System and Local Drug Law Enforcement
The most expensive proposal in the Strategy and the centerpiece
of its enforcement provisions is the expansion of prison capacity.
But federal drug policy must rely on the willingness and ability of
state governments to fund and implement it.
The Strategy called for increased federal grants to states and lo-
calities for street-level law enforcement, from $150 million in fiscal
year 1989 to $350 million in fiscal year 1990.1i7 Such enforcement
generates large numbers of arrests per dollar spent or per police/
hour. Jails and prisons are currently overcrowded, with the majority
of states operating their prison systems under various kinds of court
orders to reduce the crowding." 18 The Strategy calls for an expan-
sion of the federal prison system, but it is silent on the issue of fund-
ing for the expansion of the state prison systems. In Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings shortly after publication of the Strat-
egy, SenatorJoseph Biden pressed Director William Bennett on this
point by asking, "How much money does your drug strategy expect
116. Id. at 40-41.
117. Even at the increased level, these federal funds for drug law enforcement would
amount to less than 1% of the amounts that state and local governments spend on law
enforcement, according to the U.S. Conference of Mayors. See CRIMINALJUsTICE NEWS-
LETrER, Sept. 15, 1989, at 2 (testimony ofJoseph P. Riley).
118. As of April 1989, 35 states and the District of Columbia faced court orders or
consent decrees dealing with prison crowding at one or more facilities. GEN. ACC'T
OFF., supra note 62, at 29.
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the states to spend on prisons in order for the drug strategy goals to
be met?" Bennett's reply was "certainly several billion dollars."
Biden responded by suggesting a figure closer to $10 billion. 9 Be-
cause either estimate far exceeds the amounts the federal govern-
ment grants in law enforcement funds, which in any case cannot be
used directly for prison construction, the Strategy's most prominent
and expensive provisions can only be put into effect if the states
choose to put them into effect. Without a large, expensive, and
most likely unpopular expansion of state prisons, the number of ar-
rests and sentences could be increased only if the average length of
prison terms were to decrease sufficiently to offset the increase.
The Strategy does propose that states and localities explore "al-
ternative sentencing" options, including "shock camps" for youth,
and calls for federal funding to help implement these programs.
The Strategy seems to rule out incarceration for first time offenders,
stating that "limited prison space should be reserved for the most
serious offenders."'' 20 User sanctions proposed in an Appendix do
not include incarceration. 1 2 1 But at the same time the Strategy calls
on the States and localities for minimum mandatory sentences for
serious crimes 122 and "[v]igorous prosecution of and increased fines
for all misdemeanor . . .drug offenses."' 123
The Strategy proposes that the federal government attach a con-
dition to the "System Improvement" program grants requiring
states to adopt programs for urine testing of arrestees, prisoners,
parolees, and those on bail.' 24 No legislation imposing this condi-
tion has been passed yet, and the Strategy is unclear about how such
programs would be implemented. Moreover, implementing such
programs would almost certainly demand huge increases in the
need for probation services, treatment, or prison capacity.' 25 The
Strategy presents no cost estimates, but urine testing for all persons
in contact with the criminal justice system would require a major
reallocation or infusion of funds. The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF)
119. The exchange between Biden and Bennett is quoted in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
NEWSLETTER, supra note 117, at 2.
120. STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 125.
121. Id. at 126.
122. Id. at 125.
123. Id. at 16.
124. Id. at 100.
125. If those under correctional supervision-probation, parole, pretrial release-
are subject to monitoring without either treatment or the threat of imprisonment for
continued drug use, the programs are unlikely to reduce drug use of crime in the moni-
tored population. If treatment is not available, and agencies return those who test posi-
tive, then more will be sent back to correctional facilities more rapidly.
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system discussed above is primarily designed to monitor a commu-
nity's drug problems on the basis of a sample of arrestees.126 Some
jurisdictions have used large-scale testing to predict, on an individ-
ual basis, the likelihood of recidivism or abscondment, but imple-
mentation of drug testing throughout criminal justice systems would
represent a massive new undertaking.127
The Strategy also recommends that the states and localities adopt
provisions adopted for federal jurisdictions in the 1988 Act and
modifications of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.' 28 These
include measures for asset forfeiture, special penalties for drug vio-
lations near schools, and various user accountability laws, such as
suspension of drivers licenses for one to five years and suspension
of eligibility for state benefits for one to five years. An earlier draft
of the Strategy recommended that states be required to adopt laws
providing for suspension of drivers' licenses for drug violations as a
condition of receiving federal highway trust funds. This recommen-
dation was dropped, apparently at the insistence of Transportation
Secretary Samuel Skinner.129 The published version of the Strategy
makes no recommendations for using any federal monies other than
the ADM grants and drug law enforcement grants as devices to
force states to adopt drug policy measures preferred by the federal
government.
B. Designation of High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
The 1988 Act and the Strategy mark a departure from prior fed-
eral drug policy in proposing that some (unspecified) geographic
areas be designated as needier of federal resources than others.
The 1988 Act authorized ONDCP, in consultation with the Attorney
General, other cabinet members, and state governors, to designate
"any specified area of the United States" a "high-intensity drug traf-
ficking area" (HIDTA). The Strategy proposes general criteria for
selecting an area, including both the local severity of drug problems
and the extent to which the drug problems spill over into other
126. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
127. See, e.g., Carver, Drugs and Crime: Controlling Use and Reducing Risk through Testing,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE REPORTS, Sept./Oct. 1986 (assessing effectiveness of a
D.C. drug testing program in reducing drug abuse in criminal justice system).
128. STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 125.
129. Barnes, General Bennett, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 18-25, 1989, at 14. Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, at § 1005(c), 102 Stat. at 4186-87 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1504(c)
(Supp. 1989)).
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places.' 30 Selected HIDTAs are to receive intensive federal assist-
ance.' 3 ' In the criminal justice system, this aid could include fed-
eral/state/local task forces, assistance with intelligence analysis,
resources for drug testing of arrestees, parolees, and persons on
probation, and other types of support provided by the Bureau of
Justice Assistance. The Strategy also provides for assistance to in-
crease security at public housing facilities and allow waiver of HUD
regulations to facilitate quick evictions of public housing tenants in-
volved in drug selling. Still other provisions provide support for
community and worksite prevention programs.
None of these provisions differs much from what the Strategy rec-
ommends for the entire country. Presumably, the advantage for an
area designated as an HIDTA would be receiving more help sooner.
The Strategy omits the question of how much of the resources di-
rected to HIDTAs under these headings would consist of money for
new programs and new permanent staff and how much would be
temporary reassignment of federal personnel. The Strategy speaks
only of HIDTA "activities that may be supported by such realloca-
tion of federal resources."' 32
Even before the Strategy had been published, the ONDCP tested
the concept of concentrating federal resources on severely affected
metropolitan areas by announcing a special plan for the Washing-
ton, D.C. area.' 33 The most expensive part of the plan was a provi-
sion for construction of two new prisons to house drug offenders
from the Washington area. One was to be in the District of Colum-
bia, which had been planning a new prison for four years but has
been forced to delay construction in part by a lawsuit initiated by
residents of the area where construction was planned.' 34 The other
prison was to be a 700-bed federal facility built somewhere in the
suburbs. No site was named formally for the latter, but the ONDCP
and the Bureau of Prisons originally proposed Fort Meade in Anne
Arundel County, Maryland. Responding to the strong opposition of
130. STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 129-30. The first annual follow-up to the Strategy
was issued after this Article had been written. In that subsequent report, the ONDCP
Director designated five areas as HIDTAs: New York City, Los Angeles, Miami, Hous-
ton, and counties along the Mexican border. OFF. OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY,
THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY at app. A (1990).
131. STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 129-30.
132. Id. at 129.
133. Bennett Unveils Plan to Combat Washington Drug Crisis, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1989,
at Al, col. 5.
134. Horwitz & Spolar, Bennett Faces Inherent Hurdles in Plan to Rid D.C. of Drugs, Wash.
Post, Apr. 11, 1989, at A]2, col. 1.
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Anne Arundel residents and legislators, Maryland Governor Wil-
liam Donald Schaefer announced that he had received an assurance
from ONDCP Director Bennett that the prison would not be built at
Fort Meade.' 35 The Fort Meade site was abandoned without an
alternative.
The Bureau of Prisons then announced plans to accelerate the
long planned construction of a new federal prison in Cumberland,
in western Maryland. Since the original Washington area plan
seemed to call for a high-security prison while the plans for Cum-
berland were for a medium-security one, the confusing nature of
this announcement annoyed Allegheny County officials and western
Maryland's Congressional representative. The Bureau apparently
has backed down from its plans for a new federal prison for Wash-
ington area drug offenders. According to ONDCP officials, the
Cumberland facility, as originally planned, would eliminate the im-
mediate need for the new prison in the Washington area, but would
"not be specifically dedicated for prisoners in the Washington
area.'" 136
Other parts of the Washington plan called for NIDA to operate
three new model outpatient drug treatment programs and for the
Drug Enforcement Administration to assist in a new task force with
local police agencies. At the time of the announcement, DEA offi-
cials reported that they did not know where they were going to get
the money for the task force.137 NIDA did not know where it would
locate the three new treatment programs, and District officials had
been trying for two years to get new programs in several wards of
the city but residents had successfully blocked the plans.' 38
It would be unfair to judge the ability of the ONDCP to concen-
trate federal resources on one metropolitan area and impose a re-
gional anti-drug policy solely on the evidence of this experience in
Washington. At the time of the Washington proposal, the ONDCP
was new and not fully staffed. Washington is a difficult area in which
to coordinate regional initiatives, since two separate state govern-
ments and that of the District are involved. Finally, relations be-
tween the federal government and the District government are
135. Isikoff, Missteps on the Road to District Drug Plan, Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1989, at
A22, col. 1.
136. D.C. Area Not Getting New Prison, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
137. Isikoff, supra note 135.
138. Id.
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exceptionally poor.' 39 But the Washington experience does suggest
a number of lessons. First, the expansion of the federal and state
prison systems on which the Strategy is predicated cannot be ex-
pected to take place quickly, if at all. An attempt by federal officials
to hurry plans and force action can upset years of careful compro-
mise with elected representatives, state and local officials, as it did in
Allegheny County, or even incite a united and invincible opposition
front, as it did in Anne Arundel County. Second, the federal agen-
cies best suited to participate in negotiations with Congress, sub-
national levels of government, and community groups may be the
large, well established spending agencies with regional staff. The
ONDCP is the only federal agency with a system-wide perspective
on the drug problem, but it is not big enough to devote staff to the
detailed preparations and interminable negotiations required to get
sites approved for facilities like drug treatment clinics and prisons
over the objections of neighbors. Siting unpopular facilities is a del-
icate subject, which elected officials prefer to avoid, and in which
multiple layers of government must participate. Unless the commit-
ment to intensified law enforcement and increased treatment is
abandoned, drug policy in the next decade will largely involve just
such tasks of siting new (or expanding current) facilities.
The Strategy thus does not recognize sufficiently the diversity of
drug problems or the appropriateness and feasibility of different
measures in different places. The Strategy's one acknowledgement
of local variation is the provision for designation of HIDTAs, and
even that seems to picture what those areas need as "the same, only
more so.
V Conclusions
State and local decisionmakers should be given latitude to make
and implement drug control policy. Even in the midst of a national
cocaine epidemic, patterns of drug abuse, and the social conse-
quences of drug use and drug trafficking, differ significantly across
regions, between urban and suburban areas, and among cities. The
instruments of drug policy that now appear most promising-pre-
vention and early intervention, treatment, and street-level law en-
forcement-are wielded by local institutions: the schools, health
139. Mayor Marion Barry of Washington was not invited to the press conference at
which the plan was announced. Barry Aides Say Help is Too Much, Not Enough, Wash. Post,
Apr. 11, 1989, at AI, col. 2.
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care providers under contract, and local police. The needs for coor-
dination are at the local, not national, level.
Perhaps most importantly, there is no model drug policy on the
shelf. No one at any level of government can discern with confi-
dence the effectiveness of our current mix of laws and programs,
and no one can predict with confidence the effects of any proposed
changes. The Strategy is commendably honest on this score; it re-
lies often on induction and analogies drawn from other spheres of
public health and safety, and admits in several places that the empir-
ical basis for pronouncements is thin. 140 Conditions would seem
ideal for what Robert LaFollette and the Progressive reformers
called "the laboratory of the states." Since no community has solved
its drug problem, each could adopt different strategies and see what
works after the fact; the wider the variety, the more information to
be gained from the experiment. 4 1 The recent actions of Congress,
including the 1986 and 1988 Acts, and the recent pronouncements
of the executive branch, including the Strategy, show a tendency to-
ward renewed centralization. The Director of the ONDCP did state
in a recent speech to state officials that "[n]early all of the institu-
tions that must deal with the everyday reality of the crack epi-
demic-police, judges, schools, courts-are creatures of state
government.... That is why any plan to solve the crack problem
must involve the active cooperation of the states."' 142 But active co-
operation in implementing measures chosen at the federal level is
what he appears to have meant, since in the body of the same speech
he called "on the states to act on five specific concerns."'' 43
Decentralization of policymaking was promoted only during the
first half of the 1980s, when budgets were declining and drug abuse
was not a salient political topic. But the explanation by the Director
of NIDA for the decision to remove management of programs from
the federal agencies with the creation of block grants in 1981 still
140. In particular, recommendations concerning treatment strategy acknowledge
the inadequacy of data about which methods are effective. Though firm proposals are
nonetheless made, the Strategy admits the need for improvements in several areas of
data collection. STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 39, 43, 81-82.
141. There are limits on the range of options states and cities could try. Kurt
Schmoke, Baltimore's mayor, is a prominent advocate of legalization of some drugs; if
Baltimore legalized cocaine trafficking de facto, through non-enforcement, it would be
very difficult for its neighbors to maintain an effective ban. But the limits are very wide,
even if they do not encompass extremes. Baltimore could de-emphasize or target en-
forcement and expand treatment facilities without badly subverting the drug policies of
its neighbors.
142. Address by William Bennett, supra note 49.
143. Id.
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obtains: "The restructuring of assistance was based on a conviction
that States are better able to plan, allocate funds for, and monitor
health programs within their boundaries than is the Federal Govern-
ment."'' 44 Unfortunately, that conviction has been overturned.
During the 1990s, the trend towards centralization of drug policy
making should be reversed. The federal government should resist
the temptation to impose from above a solution to the nation's drug
problems. Nothing about the previous experience of anti-drug ef-
forts (at any level of government, it must be admitted) should give
us confidence that the solution is known. The diversity of drug
abuse problems and their consequences makes it unlikely that there
is a single solution applicable in all cities. Though it would not fit
well with the currently popular "war" metaphor, the next White
House conference on drug policy might adopt for its title the slogan
briefly used by Mao Zedong: "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom. Let a
Hundred Schools of Thought Contend."
144. Schuster, The National Institute on Drug Abuse, 84 BRIT. J. OF ADDICTION 19, 20
(1989).
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